

# OG 6.10: DDR and Security Sector Reform

## Objectives

This module will:

- ✓ provide guidance on the relationship between DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR);
- ✓ outline the opportunities and challenges relating to the nexus between DDR and SSR;
- ✓ support the development of synergies in the design, implementation and sequencing of different elements of DDR and SSR programmes.

## 1. Introduction

Both DDR and SSR are important post-conflict efforts that help create conditions necessary for sustainable peace and longer-term development. Understanding the relationship between these activities can help to ensure that short to medium term DDR activities are linked to longer term efforts to develop an effective, well-managed, and accountable security sector.

Some of the dynamics between DDR and SSR are straightforward. Both sets of activities are preoccupied with enhancing security and stability and therefore sit within a broader security sector governance framework. They advocate policies and programmes that engage public and private security actors, including the

### Box 6.10.1: Important definitions

**Security sector:** “is a broad term often used to describe the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country”. The security sector can include “defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included.” Particular emphasis should also be given to actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security.

**Security sector reform:** “describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”.

**Source:** *UN Report of the Secretary-General on “Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform”, A/62/659-S/2008/39, 23 January 2008.*

### Box 6.10.2: The DDR/SSR dynamics

- DDR shapes the terrain for SSR by influencing the size and nature of the security sector
- Successful DDR can free up resources for SSR activities that support the development of efficient, affordable security structures
- A national vision of the security sector should provide the basis for decisions on force size and structure
- SSR considerations – appropriate skills sets and past conduct – should help determine criteria for the integration of ex-combatants in the formal/informal security sector
- DDR and SSR offer complementary approaches that can link reintegration of ex-combatants to enhancing community security
- Capacity-building for security management and oversight bodies provide a means to enhance the sustainability and legitimacy of both DDR and SSR

military and ex-combatants as well as groups responsible for their management and oversight. Decisions associated with DDR contribute to defining central elements of the size and composition of a country's security sector. SSR may lead to the downsizing of security institutions and the consequent need for reintegration. Most significantly, considering these issues together can ensure that DDR programmes reflect national capacities, objectives and values as part of a broader vision for national security. Failing to consider these issues together may lead to the development of unsustainable and unaccountable security institutions that fail to address the security needs of the state and its citizens.

There are several challenges to realising synergies between DDR and SSR in practice. These include context-specificity, a lack of coordination and flexibility in DDR and SSR programming; weak or dysfunctional institutions; capacity gaps amongst national and international actors, and; a lack of political will to support SSR. In order to avoid doing more harm than good, assessments, programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation that address the nexus between DDR and SSR should therefore be grounded in an understanding of context-specific political, socio-economic and security factors.



*Do you need more information on SSR? See the Report of the Secretary-General on "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform", A/62/659-S/2008/39, 23 January 2008; or, contact the UN DPKO SSR Unit at: [ssr@un.org](mailto:ssr@un.org). The SSR Unit provides technical advice on SSR processes, manages a UN SSR community of practice, and is the chair of the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on SSR.*

## 2. Important DDR and SSR dynamics to consider before and during demobilization


This table highlights synergies that may be realised between DDR and SSR activities prior to and during demobilization. An area of particular importance relates to the integration of ex-combatants into the security sector. Communication


and coordination between DDR and SSR stakeholders is a key theme in supporting the synergies identified in this table.

**Table 6.10.1: DDR/SSR considerations prior and during demobilization**

<p><b>Disarmament and longer-term SSR</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Consider disarmament as an entry-point for DDR/SSR coordination – define law enforcement support needed to support the disarmament process and communicate this to SSR-relevant authorities.</li> <li>■ Support capacity building to enhance national control over military/police/paramilitary armouries and surplus stocks of weapons and ammunition.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Entry-criteria</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Establish and apply clear and appropriate criteria for entry into the security forces based on an assessment of national security requirements to ensure that the security sector is capable of absorbing those ex-combatants that choose integration.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Rank harmonisation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Develop rank harmonisation policies based on context-specific criteria for determining ranks, affirmative action for marginalised groups, and a clear formula for conversion from former armed groups to national armed forces.</li> <li>■ Consider the potential consequences of rank harmonisation on the defence budget as well as potential security risks created by perceived inequities.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Data collection and management</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Identify and include SSR-relevant information requirements (for an indicative list see IDDRS 6.10, Box 2) when designing a Management Information System (MIS) and establish mechanisms for sharing this information.</li> <li>■ Include information collected in the MIS as a baseline for a future security sector census or vetting process.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Vetting</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Support vetting as part of a broader process of certification (including verification of age, education, relevant skills, criminal and human rights record).</li> <li>■ Only conduct vetting if there is sufficient political will / national capacity to implement this process.</li> <li>■ Define and apply minimum standards in relation to required skills and past conduct.</li> <li>■ Vet all members of the security institution – not just ex-combatants – to avoid stigmatisation and enhance the integrity of the security sector as a whole.</li> </ul>

<b>Support to ex-combatants integrating within the security sector</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Provide psychosocial support and training/sensitisation on behaviour change for a successful transition to civilian life or into the security sector.</li> <li>■ Engage in HIV/AIDS prevention at the outset of DDR to reduce new infections.</li> </ul>
<b>Balancing demobilization and security sector integration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Carefully consider incentives for demobilization and integration into the security sector to avoid the risk of unsustainable or disproportionate distribution of applicants between the two processes.</li> <li>■ Develop a communications strategy to ensure that options are fully understood and avoid misperceptions.</li> </ul>
<b>Gender-responsive DDR and SSR</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Ensure that women are informed of their options under the DDR and SSR processes and that integration opportunities are realistic.</li> <li>■ Make adequate facilities available for women during disarmament and demobilization and provide specialised reinsertion kits and appropriate reintegration options.</li> <li>■ Take into account the specific challenges faced by female ex-combatants (stigma, non-conventional skills sets, trauma) when considering their integration into the security sector.</li> </ul>

 *When developing the information management system for the demobilization phase, efforts should be made from the outset to include data that will be useful to share with a wider group of stakeholders, including SSR. If appropriate, a mechanism should be put in place to enable the transfer of this data. Confidentiality issues should be considered in order to mitigate against inappropriate use of information.*

 **For a more detailed explanation of the issues identified in Table 6.10.1, please see section 7 of IDDRS 6.10 on DDR and Security Sector Reform.**

 **OG 5.60 for information on HIV/AIDS and DDR**

 **OG 5.10 for information on Women, Gender and DDR**

### 3. DDR and SSR dynamics to consider before and during reintegration and repatriation

This table highlights common DDR/SSR concerns before and during the reintegration phase. Security sector capacities that support the reintegration of ex-combatants will only be focused on this priority if support to the DDR process is factored into planning, training and resource allocation. Communication with SSR stakeholders is therefore of key importance.

**Table 6.10.2: Potential DDR/SSR synergies prior to and during reintegration**

<b>Planning and preparation in receiving communities</b>	<p>The DDR programme should plan and budget for the following community initiatives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <i>Reintegration planning</i>: ensure that reintegration planning is coordinated with the military, police and other community level security providers.</li> <li>■ <i>Community security</i>: Consider opportunities for confidence building through joint community safety initiatives (e.g. weapons collection, community policing).</li> <li>■ <i>Violence reduction</i>: support work with men and boys in violence reduction initiatives, including gender-based violence.</li> </ul>
<b>Common DDR/SSR information requirements</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <i>Tracking returning ex-combatants</i>: Assess the security dynamics of returning ex-combatants to facilitate reinsertion payments, highlight areas where employment opportunities exist, identify potential security risks and prioritise appropriate security sector responses.</li> <li>■ <i>Public information and dialogue</i>: promote dialogue between communities and security providers to develop local security plans that address reintegration.</li> </ul>
<b>Sector-specific considerations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ <i>DDR and the private security sector</i>: include the relationship between reintegration and the private security sector in evaluations of reintegration into rural and urban settings. Share this analysis with SSR counterparts.</li> <li>■ <i>DDR and border management</i>: Assess flows of ex-combatants and weapons across borders in order to coordinate/prioritise responses with border security authorities.</li> <li>■ <i>DDR and SALW</i>: include coordination with SALW initiatives in DDR/SSR planning; SALW availability and control measures should form part of joint assessments and inform subsequent programme design.</li> </ul>



**For a more detailed explanation of the issues identified in Table 6.10.2, please see section 8 of IDDRS 6.10 on DDR and Security Sector Reform.**



*DDR programming should be undertaken on the basis of continuous communication between DDR and SSR stakeholders. Efforts should be made to ensure regular information sharing between law enforcement and DDR authorities to ensure support to DDR objectives. In cases where private security companies are a source of employment for ex-combatants, regulation and appropriate oversight mechanisms should be established. Efforts should also be made to share information with border management authorities on high risk areas for foreign combatants crossing borders.*

## 4. Programming issues

Integrating relevant SSR concerns into DDR assessments, programme design, monitoring and evaluation is a way to build synergies into DDR and SSR programming.

**Table 6.10.3: Assessments, programme design, monitoring & evaluation (M&E)**

<p><b>SSR-sensitive assessments</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Include the need to identify potential DDR/SSR synergies in TORs.</li> <li>■ Disseminate draft TORs among DDR and SSR focal points.</li> <li>■ Include multi-sectoral SSR experts in assessment teams. For general assessments, expertise in the political and integrated nature of an SSR process may be more important than sector-specific experience.</li> <li>■ Ensure host state / regional expertise as well as local language skills are available.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Programme design</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Clarify context-specific DDR/SSR dynamics relevant for programme development and costing (see Box 6.10.3 below).</li> <li>■ Map DDR/SSR capacities across UN, international community and national actors.</li> <li>■ Seek to integrate different stakeholders within the DDR implementation plan.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Monitoring and evaluation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Collect and monitor baseline data on political and security dynamics to help planners adjust programming to changing conditions.</li> <li>■ Review DDR and SSR programmes jointly to ensure they are planned and implemented in a mutually supportive manner. Focus on actual versus intended impact to adjust programming objectives and priorities.</li> <li>■ Conduct mid-term reviews to assess effectiveness and make necessary changes to programmes.</li> </ul>



**For more detailed information on programme design and assessments, see OG 3.20 on DDR Programme Design.**



**For more detailed information on monitoring and evaluation, see OG 3.50 on Monitoring and Evaluation of DDR Programmes.**

**Box 6.10.3: Indicative SSR-related questions to include in assessments**

- Is there a strategic policy framework or a process in place to develop a national security and justice strategy that can be used to inform DDR decision-making?
- Map the security actors that are active at the national level as well as in regions particularly relevant for the DDR process. How do they relate to each other?
- What are the regional political and security dynamics that may positively or negatively impact on DDR/SSR?
- Map the international actors active in DDR/SSR. What areas do they support and how do they coordinate?
- What non-state security providers exist and what gaps do they fill in the formal security sector? Are they supporting or threatening the stability of the State? Are they supporting or threatening the security of individuals and communities?
- What oversight and accountability mechanisms are in place for the security sector at national, regional and local levels?
- Do security sector actors play a role or understand their functions in relation to supporting DDR? Is there capacity/political will to play this role?
- What are existing mandates and policies of formal security sector actors in providing security for vulnerable and marginalised groups?
- Are plans for the DDR process compatible with Government priorities for the security sector?
- Do DDR funding decisions take into account the budget available for the SSR process as well as the long-run financial means available so that gaps and delays are avoided?
- What is the level of national management capacity (including human resource and financial aspects) to support these programmes?
- Who are the potential champions and spoilers in relation to the DDR and SSR processes?
- What are public perceptions toward the formal and informal security sector?



*DDR assessments should be sensitive to SSR issues and stakeholders. DDR programme design should incorporate context-specific security dynamics and identify key stakeholders at international, national and sub-national levels. Monitoring and evaluation should be carried out systematically and efforts made to link DDR and SSR concerns. M&E should be considered as an entry-point for linking DDR and SSR concerns in planning.*



**National dialogue, peace processes and national security or sector-specific policy reviews represent entry points for linking DDR and SSR within a broader national governance framework. For more information on entry-points available for linking DDR and SSR, see section 9.4 of IDDRS 6.10 on DDR and Security Sector Reform.**

## 5. National ownership

Strong emphasis on national ownership is critical to addressing challenges of legitimacy and sustainability that are common to DDR and SSR. Box 6.10.4 identifies

different ways to enhance national ownership of DDR/SSR processes through promoting broad participation in decision making and building national capacity in these areas. SSR activities that seek to strengthen security sector management and oversight bodies provide an important means of enhancing capacities that can support both DDR and SSR in a coherent and effective manner.

#### **Box 6.10.4: Promoting national ownership**

- Support national dialogue processes that seek to identify security needs and values in order to foster common understandings of DDR/SSR challenges. Include transitional or elected authorities, security sector institutions, management and oversight bodies as well as civil society.
- Agree a roadmap between national and international stakeholders for implementation of identified priorities.
- Jointly establish capacity-development strategies with national authorities (see IDDRS 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR) that support both DDR and SSR objectives.
- Prioritise the development of cross-cutting skills that will also be useful in future peace-building and development programmes (human resources, financial management, building gender capacity etc.).
- Identify and empower national reform 'champions' that support reform principles. Such figures should be identified during the needs assessment phase.
- Support national level management and oversight bodies to lead and harmonise DDR and SSR activities.
- Consider twinning international experts with national counterparts in order to support skills transfer and thus support reform efforts which are driven from the inside.
- Support national DDR/SSR committees as a mechanism to coordinate implementation and evaluation of programmes.



**For more detailed information on UN support to national efforts, see Table 3.30.2 of OG 3.30 on National Institutions for DDR.**

## 6. Supporting coherent approaches

### 6.1. Coordination

While the UN has often played a key role in DDR, SSR activities (including funding) are frequently supported by a number of bilateral donors through specific arrangements with national authorities. This necessitates the establishment of effective coordination mechanisms. While it is recognised that national actors should have the key role to play in coordination, in cases where the political will or capacity to do this is lacking, the international community should support these efforts.

There is a need to ensure coherent international support to nationally-driven DDR and SSR processes. Box 6.10.5 outlines some key considerations for supporting coherent approaches in the areas of coordination, financial sustainability, and capacity-building.

### Box 6.10.5: Key considerations for supporting coherent approaches

- Have opportunities been taken to engage with different bodies of the security sector on how they can support the DDR process?
- Are there national/international coordination mechanisms in place? Could the national commission on DDR fulfil this role by inviting a wider range of stakeholders to selected meetings? Beyond 'core' DDR and SSR stakeholders, the membership of such a body should include representatives from health (including national HIV/AIDS Control Programmes and strategies), gender, youth and child protection as well as the humanitarian community.
- Are the financial resource implications of DDR for the security sector considered, and vice versa?
- Are both DDR and SSR programmes realistic and compatible with national budgets?
- Are DDR/SSR concerns reflected in the ToRs of UN personnel and in the profiles for different posts and in training considerations?
- Is cross-participation in DDR or SSR training encouraged in order to support knowledge transfer and confidence building?

6.10

## 7. Summary of key guidance on DDR and security sector reform

- ✓ Planning for DDR should take into account the relationship between DDR and its consequences for the security sector and its governance. DDR decisions should reflect and reinforce a nationally-driven vision of the role, objective and values of security institutions. Similarly, DDR considerations should be introduced into SSR decision-making to enable the security institutions to provide appropriate support to the DDR process.
- ✓ In order to build synergies between DDR and SSR, coherence across DDR and SSR activities is essential. Important issues include: rank harmonisation; financial incentive packages for reintegration vs integration; communication strategies designed to facilitate the transition from combatant to security provider, etc. . . (See other examples in sections 2 and 3 of this chapter).
- ✓ Resource planning must seek to identify gaps, increase coherence and mitigate competition between DDR and SSR and ensure sustainability in relation to national capacities. Financial resource implications of DDR for the security sector should be considered, and DDR and SSR programmes should be realistic and compatible with national budgets.
- ✓ Efforts should be made to sensitise staff on the DDR/SSR nexus through training and sensitisation activities. The need for personnel to link DDR and SSR concerns should be included in the ToRs of relevant personnel and cross-participation in DDR or SSR training encouraged to foster knowledge transfer and build relationships.